Private takings by Marchesiani, Alessandro & Nosal, Ed
Private Takings
Alessandro Marchesiani
University of Bath
Ed Nosal
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
February 23, 2016
Abstract
This paper examines the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court
ruling, Kelo v. City of New London. Kelo can be interpreted as support-
ing eminent domain as a means of transferring property rights from one set
of private agents landowners to another private agent a developer. Under
voluntary exchange, where the developer sequentially acquires property rights
from landowners via bargaining, a holdout problem arises. Eminent domain
gives all of the bargaining power to the developer and, as a result, eliminates
the holdout problem. This is the benet of Kelo. However, landowners lose
all their bargaining power and, as a result, their property investments become
more ine¢ cient. This is the cost of Kelo. A policy of eminent domain in-
creases social welfare compared to voluntary sequential exchange only when
the holdout problem is severe, and this occurs only if the developer has very
little bargaining power. We propose an alternative government policy that
eliminates the holdout problem but does not a¤ect the bargaining power of the
various parties. This alternative policy strictly dominates a policy of eminent
domain, which implies that eminent domain is an ine¢ cient way to transfer
property rights between private agents.
1 Introduction
A recent Supreme Court decision, Kelo v. City of New London (2005), rea¢ rmed
that the public-use criterion from the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
US constitution1 can be fullled even when a government takes property from one
private agent and gives it to another. Although the Court has long rejected a literal
We wish to thank Aleks Berentsen, Ricardo Cavalcanti, Guillaume Rocheteau, Perry Shapiro
and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed here do not
necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
1[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
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interpretation of public use,2 the Kelo decision generated a fair amount of controversy
both among the judiciary and the public. Perhaps it is because the public purpose3
of the taking that underlies Kelo is less transparent than previous important Court
rulings.
In the landmark case of Berman v. Parker (1954), the owners of a non-blighted
department store had their property taken as part of a large scale redevelopment
plan to rid parts of Washington D.C. from blight and slums. The redevelopment plan,
provided by the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, included the condemnation
of non-blighted buildings. The Court unanimously ruled that private property can be
taken for public purpose as long as owners receive just compensation. Furthermore,
it ruled that it is up to lawmakers not courts to decide what is in the publics best
interest.4 In Berman v. Parker, the public purpose of the taking is easy to visualize:
It turns something that is ugly and dangerous into something that is beautiful and
safe.
In another important case, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midki¤ (1984), the
Hawaiian legislature proposed to regulate an oligopoly in the housing market by
taking away the property rights from a few large landowners, with compensation,
and distributing them to many new owners. As in Berman v. Parker, the Court
deferred to the legislature as to whether the public purpose was being served, and
unanimously ruled in favor of the legislatures actions. Given that governments have
made a practice of regulating industries that exhibit market power for many years,
it is plausible to envision that the taking served a public purpose.
Qualitatively speaking, the basic facts of Kelo are not so di¤erent from the above
cases. The city of New London formulated an economic development plan that would
benet the city and its residents by providing growth opportunities and increased tax
revenues. As in Berman v. Parker and Midki¤ , the citys plan required the taking
of private property that would ultimately be owned by other private parties. The
Court ruled in favor of the city of New London. However, unlike Berman v. Parker
and Midki¤ , the Court rendered a split 5-4 decision. And there was a vigorous public
debate regarding the appropriateness of the decision. Much of the debate focused on
whether taking property for private economic development serves a public purpose.
Even though the Court deferred to the legislature regarding the public purpose in
Midki¤ , it did not absolve itself from interfering when the public purpose was at
question: A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public
use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus
2In Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley (1896) and Clark v. Nash (1905), the Court ruled in
favor of a taking that only benetted a small set of private landowners. A short summary of relevant
cases regarding the denition of public use, some of which we refer to, can be found in Rolnick and
Davies (2006).
3In Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co., v. Alabama Interstate Power Co. (1916), the
Court only required that a taking serve a public purpose.
4[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh
conclusive ... ,(Berman at 32).
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be void ... The courts cases have repeatedly stated that one persons property may
not be taken for the benet of another private person without a justifying public
purpose, even though compensation be paid, (Midki¤ at 245 and 241, respectively).
Evidently, in the minds of a great number of people, the case that private economic
development serves a public purpose was not made in Kelo. In response to the Kelo
decision, 43 states changed their eminent domain laws that placed limitations and/or
restrictions on municipalitiesuse of eminent domain when the stated public purpose
was economic development.
From an economic perspective, some sort of market failure or friction must exist
if a government taking is to be part of the solution for a redevelopment project. For
example, market solutions to redevelop blighted areas may fail because of a free-rider
externality, see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980) and OFlaherty (1994). In a blighted
area, property owners may be reluctant to sell their properties to developers at low
prices even though these prices are appropriate for the properties in their current
state because they anticipate the value of their properties will increase as the area
is redeveloped. Because of this, the market will deliver redevelopment projects that
are too small from a social perspective. A government taking, along with just com-
pensation, can internalize this externality, and result in socially preferable outcomes.
The Berman v. Parker decision can be rationalized along these lines.
It would be di¢ cult, however, to justify the Kelo decision by appealing to a free-
rider argument. For starters, the proposed redevelopment area in New London was
not blighted or run-down. Given this, how would Suzette Kelos property value be
a¤ected if the redevelopment project proceeded without the sale of her property?
Being close to a new shopping area would be benecial, since it would be convenient
for running errands, dining etc. But the new shopping area and a major research
facility would bring about increased tra¢ c and congestion, which would be costly.
Since it is not at all obvious which e¤ect would dominate, it would not be unrea-
sonable to assume that property values would be una¤ected by the redevelopment.
That is, there are no external benets associated with the taking. One can interpret
the dissenting opinion of Justice Day OConnor being consistent with such a view,
Any property may now be taken for the benet of another private party ... the
beneciaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate inuence and power
in the political process, including large corporations and development rmsand the
decision eliminates any distinction between private and public use of property 
and thereby e¤ectively delete[s] the words for public usefrom the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment,(Kelo at 12-13 and 2, respectively, OConnor, J., dissenting).
If a free-rider externality argument cannot be used to support the Kelo decision, then
how can the majority decision of the supreme court be justied from an economic
perspective?
One possible justication for the Kelo decision, which we explore in this article,
is that the existence of bargaining frictions prevent the level of redevelopment from
being e¢ cient. Bargaining endows both the developer and seller with pricing powers
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that can lead to an ine¢ cient level of redevelopment. Ine¢ ciencies associated with
redevelopment can but need not be exacerbated because of a holdout problem
that arises when a developer negotiates with many property owners. In particular,
the holdout problem where each owner attempts to extract additional surplus from
the developer can arise due to the sequential nature of bargaining between the de-
veloper and landowners. Ideas related to bargaining have been explored in Munch
(1976) and Eckart (1985). These authors rely on informational asymmetries to gen-
erate an ine¢ ciency in land assembly. Absent these informational asymmetries, there
would be no role for government takings. We specify a simple and intuitive bar-
gaining environment that is free of informational asymmetries. Because bargaining
frictions prevent private agents from implementing e¢ cient allocations, we examine if
government policy can improve matters. One obvious government policy to consider
is eminent domain.
Once the possibility of a government taking that transfers property rights from
one private agent to another is introduced, then, almost by denition, property rights
become less secure. As pointed out by Rolnik and Davies (2006) and Garrett and
Rothstein (2007), when property rights are not secure, ine¢ ciencies in land use will
arise. We believe this to be a rather important aspect associated with a government
taking, so we appeal to a model environment rst proposed by Blume, Rubinfeld
and Shapiro (1984) that emphasizes it.
In the model, a policy of eminent domain e¤ectively gives all of the bargaining
power to the developer. As a result, the holdout problem disappears since landowners
have no bargaining power. This is the benet of a policy of eminent domain. How-
ever, landowners will invest more resources in their properties when their bargaining
power declines. Since landowners are overinvesting under voluntary exchange, emi-
nent domain exacerbates the overinvestment problem. This is the cost of a policy of
eminent domain. A policy of eminent domain is socially benecial only if the benet
associated with the elimination of the holdout problem exceeds the cost associated
with increasing the overinvestment problem, and this occurs only when the developer
has very little bargaining power.
We propose an alternative government policy that, like eminent domain, removes
the holdout problem by eliminating the sequential nature of bargaining. However,
this policy does not a¤ect the bargaining power of the various parties. The policy can
be interpreted as lockingthe developer and all of the landowners whose properties
the developer wants in a roomand requiring them to collectively determine a set
of prices for the transference of the property rights. Since this collective bargaining
policy eliminates the holdout problem but does not a¤ect the various partiesbar-
gaining powers, it strictly dominates the eminent domain policy. Hence, a private
taking i.e., using eminent domain to transfer property rights of one set of private
agents to another is never socially e¢ cient.
The remainder of the article is as follows. The next section describes the economic
environment. Section 3 characterizes the socially optimal allocation and Section 4
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demonstrates that voluntary exchange, via bargaining, results in an ine¢ cient alloca-
tion. Section 5 examines the e¤ect that two government policies private takings and
collective bargaining have on social welfare and establishes that a policy of collective
bargaining always dominates a policy of private takings. Section 6 summarizes and
concludes.
2 Model Environment
The economy is populated with a developer and N > 1 landowners (or simply own-
ers). Each owner is endowed with K` units of capital and property rights to a tract of
land. Each owner invests x on his property and K` x in a safe asset. The safe asset
provides a gross rate of return R > 1. The property investment provides a payo¤ of
f(x), where we assume that f (0) = 0, 0 < f 0 (0) <1, f 00 < 0 and
Assumption 1: f 000 (x) f 0 (x)  2f 00 (x)2  0.
Assumption 1 places restrictions on the third derivative of f . Functions such as
b ln (1 + x) or a  b= (b=a+ x) satisfy the restrictions that we have imposed on f (x),
where the former function satises Assumption 1 with an equality and the latter
function with a strict inequality.
The developer is endowed with capital Kd. He can redevelop ownersproperties
and can invest in the safe asset. If an owners property is redeveloped, then the invest-
ment x undertaken by the owner, as well as the potential payo¤, f(x), are destroyed.
The total value associated with redevelopment is given by F (A; y), where A repre-
sents the tracts of land acquired for redevelopment by the developer (which includes
the required tract) and y represents the developers total spending on redevelopment.
We assume that F (A; y) is strictly increasing in its arguments, FA; Fy > 0, and
strictly concave, FAA   F 2Ay=Fyy  G (A; y) < 0, with FA (0; y) = Fy (A; 0) ! 1 for
y; A > 0, and
Assumption 2: GA (A; y) Gy (A; y)FAy (A; y) =Fyy (A; y) > 0.
Assumption 2 also imposes restrictions on the third derivative of F . A standard
Cobb-Douglas function kAy with  +  < 1 satises all of the restrictions that we
have imposed on F (k is a constant).
The N tracts of land are contiguous and located around a circle. We assume
that any redevelopment must include a specic or required tract of land, and if
redevelopment uses more than one tract of land, then all the redeveloped properties
must be adjacent to one another. In particular, the second property must be clockwise
adjacent to the required tract, the third must be clockwise adjacent to the second,
and so on. The idea here is that once the required tract is determined, the sequence
in which particular tracts can be used for redevelopment is also determined.
The developer must acquire property rights to redevelop. These rights can be
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voluntarily transferred via bargaining from the owner to the developer for a price p.
When the developer wants to acquire property rights directly from A  1 owners
he bargains sequentially with them. In particular, the developer and A owners play
the following A-stage sequential bargaining game. First, each of the A owners are
placed in a bargaining queue. Let i 2 f1; : : : ; Ag represent the place in the queue
held by a particular owner, owner i. An owners place in the queue is determined by
the sequence in which particular tracts can be used for redevelopment as described
above, i.e., the rst person in the queue owns the required tract, the second person
in the queue has his property clockwise adjacent to the required tract, and so on.
Since the owner knows the location of his own property as well as the location of
the required tract, he knows his position in the bargaining queue. The developer
sequentially bargains with each of the A owners: The developer bargains rst with
owner i = 1, second with owner i = 2, and so on. At each stage i 2 f1; : : : ; Ag of
the A-stage sequential bargaining game, the developer and owner i play the following
simple two-stage proposal game. In the rst stage, the developer makes an o¤er pi
to owner i, which he either accepts or rejects. If rejected, then agents move to the
second stage, where, with probability , the developer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
to the owner and, with probability 1 , the owner makes the o¤er, which the owner
can either accept or reject. One can interpret  (1  ) as the developers (owners)
bargaining power. The developer can proceed from stage i to stage i+1 in the A-stage
bargaining game only if he has reached an agreement with the rst i owners, i.e., the
developer and owner i agree to exchange property rights for pi. If the developer and
owner i do not reach an agreement, i.e., the owner rejects the developers initial o¤er
and the second stage o¤er is also rejected, then the A-stage bargaining game ends,
then all the agreements with the previous i 1 owners are extinguished or invalidated,
and no redevelopment takes place. This means that once the developer chooses the
number of tracts of land to redevelop, A, and owners to bargain with, the developer
either acquires the property rights for all A tracts and redevelops them, or there is
no redevelopment.
There exists a government that can condemn and expropriate, or take, the prop-
erty via its power of eminent domain, ED. The law requires the government provides
just compensationto the owner in the event that his land is taken. In this article,
just compensation will be dened as f (x), i.e., the value of the property in the event
that it is not taken. The government must balance its budget. We assume that if
property is taken, the government sells the property rights to the developer for f (x).5
The timing of events is as follows: At date 0, N owners are born, each owning
property rights to a tract of land. Each owner has capital K`, invests x in his tract
of land and (K`   x) in the safe asset. Owners do not know where the required
(for redevelopment) tract of land is located; at the time they make their investment
5In addition to ED, we also propose and consider a government policy (called collective bargain-
ing) that a¤ects the structure of bargaining between the developer and the A owners. We detail this
proposal in Section 5.2.
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decision, each tract is equally likely to be required for redevelopment. At date 1, the
developer is born and the required tract is revealed to all. The developer decides
the number of properties, A, he wishes to acquire and redevelop, where 0 < A  N .
The developer then identies the set of owners associated with the A tracts of land,
and either bargains with them or has the government take away their property rights
and sell them to him if the government imposes the ED policy. After the developer
acquires the property rights for A tracts of land, he spends y on redevelopment and
invests the rest of his capital, Kd   y, in the safe asset. At date 2, all investments
pay o¤, payments are exchanged, and the owners and the developer consume.
The objectives of the owner and the developer are to maximize their expected
payo¤s. The timing of the births of the owners and the developer prevent them
from interacting before the owners make their investment decisions. This timing
assumption is designed to reect the real world fact that developers enter the scene
long after initial investments have been made.
3 Social Optimum
We rst characterize the social optimum. Let W (A; x; y) represent social welfare,
which is the sum of the payo¤s of all agents in the economy. The socially e¢ cient
levels of property acquisition, A, investment, x and redevelopment spending, y, are
given by the solution to
max
x;y;A
W (A; x; y) = max
x;y;A
(N   A)f (x) + F (A; y) +N (K`   x)R + (Kd   y)R: (1)
When the investment decision x is made, it is not known where the required (for
redevelopment) tract of land is located. Therefore, each tract of land and there
are N of them receives the same level of investment, x, and the remainder of the
owners capital is invested in the safe asset. Since A properties will be acquired
and redeveloped, the total payo¤ to the ownersinvestments is (N   A)f (x). The
developer spends y on redevelopment so the payo¤ to redevelopment is F (A; y). The
developer places Kd   y in the safe asset. The necessary conditions to problem (1)
are, 
N A
N
f 0 (x) = R if A  `
x = 0 if A > `
; (2)
Fy (A; y) = R; (3)
and
FA (A; y) = f (x) ; (4)
where ` solves
N   `
N
f 0 (0) = R:
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Conditions (2) and (3) simply say that the expected returns to investment x
and spending y equal the opportunity cost of capital, R.6 Condition (4) says that
properties will continue to be acquired until the value of the last property equals the
(social) cost of redevelopment, which is the value of the destroyed investment, f (x).
The conditions that identify an interior maximum to problem (1) are given by (2)-(4)
and,
Fyy < 0 (5)
FyyFAA   F 2Ay > 0 (6)
(N   A) f 00 (x) FyyFAA   F 2Ay  Fyyf 0 (x)2 < 0: (7)
Conditions (5)-(7) are all satised since F (A; y) and f (x) are strictly concave. Let
(A; x; y) represent the solution to (2)-(4).
It will be useful to diagrammatically characterize the social optimum in (x;A)
space. The slope of the locus of points described by (2) for x > 0 is negative and
given by
dA
dx
=
f 00 (x)
f 0 (x)2
NR < 0; (8)
and the derivative of (8) with respect to x is
d2A
dx2
=
f 000 (x) f 0 (x)  2f 00 (x)2
f 0 (x)3
NR  0; (9)
owing to Assumption 1. In our diagrams we will assume that (9) holds with strict
equality, which means that (2) is linear in (A; x) space for x > 0. Equation (2)
is depicted in Figure 1 as `xmax, where ` stands for landowner. Note that the
allocation (xmax; 0) lies on locus `xmax, where xmax solves f 0 (xmax) = R, i.e., this is
the condition for investment, (2), when there is no redevelopment, i.e., when A = 0.
The slope of the locus of points described by (4), conditional on e¢ cient redevel-
opment spending y, (3), is also negative in (x;A) space and is given by
dA
dx
=
f 0 (x)
FAA   F 2Ay=Fyy
=
f 0 (x)
G (A; y)
< 0; (10)
since, from (3), dy =  (FAy=Fyy)dA and F (A; y) is strictly concave. The derivative
of (10) with respect to x is
d2A
dx2
=
f 00G (A; y)  (f 0)2 =G (A; y) [GA (A; y) Gy (A; y)FAy=Fyy]
G (A; y)2
> 0
thanks to Assumption 2. This means that locus (4), conditional on (3), is strictly
convex. Figure 1 depicts equations (3) and (4) as dD, where dstands for devel-
oper.
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Figure 1: Social Optimum
In Figure 1, the `xmax and dD loci intersect twice.7 Social welfare is maximized
at allocation a = (x; A), where the slope of the `xmax curve is steeper than that
of the dD curve. To understand this, note that condition (7) can be rewritten as
f 0 (x)
FAA   F 2Ay=Fyy
>
f 00 (x)
f 0 (x)
(N   A) :
This condition says that the local interior maximum occurs where the `xmax curve
is steeper than that of the dD curve, i.e., compare (8) and (10).
Moving away from allocation a = (x; A) along either curve `xmax or dD
unambiguously lowers social welfare. Assuming that condition (3) holds, the slope of
a social welfare indi¤erence curve is given by
dA
dx
=
(N   A) f 0 (x) NR
f (x)  FA :
6The second line in (2) says that the expected return is less than R at x = 0 when A > `; hence,
no investment is undertaken.
7For these loci to intersect at all requires that the redevelopment function F not dominate
the private investment function f . Specically, suppose we re-express the redevelopment function
as F (A; y;P ), where P represents total factor productivity. If total factor productivity, P , is not
too big,then the `xmax and dD loci will intersect twice. If, however, P is too big,then the
loci do not intersect and the socially optimal outcome is that all N tracts of land are redeveloped
and x = 0. That it is socially optimal to develop all private property, however, does not appear to
describe the world in which we live. Hence, we assume that P is not too big,which implies that
the two loci intersect twice.
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For allocations on the `xmax curve, the slope of the social welfare indi¤erence curve
is zero and for allocations on the dD curve, it is innite. A typical social welfare
indi¤erence curve that intersects allocation ~a (where ~A < A and ~x > x) is given
by the ellipse denoted ~W in Figure 1. Note that for allocations that are south-east
of allocation a = (x; A) and that lie in between (but not on) the `xmax and dD
curves such as allocation ~a the slopes of the social welfare indi¤erence curves are
all strictly positive and nite. This implies that if two allocations lie in the cone
given by xmaxaD and a line that connects the two allocations has a strictly negative
slope such as allocations a and ~a in Figure 1 then the allocation that has higher
redevelopment and lower investment will generate a higher level of social welfare, i.e.,
the social welfare associated with allocation a exceeds that of ~a.8
4 Voluntary Exchange
Here we characterize the equilibrium outcome when the developer obtains property
rights via voluntary exchange by bargaining with the owners. At date 0, each of the
N owners invests x on his tract of land and at date 1, the developer decides on the
number of properties to acquire, A, and bargains with A owners. Let pi represent the
equilibrium price that the developer pays to the ith owner in the bargaining queue.
The equilibrium price, pi, which is determined by the A-stage sequential bargaining
game, is given by
pi = f (x) + (1  ) i 1[F (A; y)  yR  Af (x)]; i = 1; : : : ; A: (11)
See Appendix 1 for the derivation of pi. The equilibrium price, pi, provides owner i
with his reservation value, f (x), plus a share of the redevelopment surplus, F (A; y) 
yR Af (x). Dene S (A; x; y)  F (A; y) yR Af (x). Note that the share of each
owners surplus depends on his place in the bargaining queue. In particular, pi > pi+1
for all i = 1; : : : ; A   1, so there is an early-moveradvantage for the owners. The
average price per tract of land that the developer pays is
AX
i=1
pi
A
 p = f (x) +
 
1  A
A
S (A; x; y) : (12)
8Note that in Figure 1 the developers locus, dD, extends beyond N . Feasibility requires
that A  N . Therefore, the feasible developers locus is given by locus Dd^N in Figure 1. This
implies that the feasible developers locus intersects the owners locus at (0; N), in addition to the two
intersections already described. It is possible to generate examples where social welfare at allocation
(0; N) exceeds that of allocation a. This happens if total factor productivity P (described in the
previous footnote) is su¢ ciently large.This should not be surprising: When P is su¢ ciently large
the redevelopment technology dominates the private technology f(x). In the analysis that follows
we implicitly assume that P is not su¢ ciently largewhich implies that social welfare attains its
maximum value at allocation a.
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When an owner makes his investment decision, x, he does not know if his land
will be acquired by the developer and, if it is, what place in the bargaining queue he
will occupy. Given these informational restrictions, the typical owners investment
decision is given by
argmax
x
N   A
N
f (x) +
A
N
p+ (K`   x)R: (13)
The function in (13) has the following interpretation: With probability (N   A) =N ,
the owners property rights will not be acquired by the developer, in which case
his payo¤ is f (x), and, with complementary probability, his property rights will be
acquired for an expected (or average) price of p, given by (12). The solution to the
owners problem (13) is given implicitly by8<:

N (1 A)A
N

f 0 (x) = R; if A  `V
x = 0 if A > `V
(14)
where the V in `V stands for voluntary exchange,and `V solves 
N    1  `V  `V
N
!
f 0 (0) = R:
The slope of the locus of points described by (14) for x > 0 is
dA
dx
=
f 00 (x)
f 0 (x)2

1  A (1 + A ln ()) 1NR < 0; (15)
since 1   A (1 + A ln ()) > 0.9 The solution to the owners decision problem (14)
is illustrated in Figure 2 by the line `V xmax. For comparison, the socially e¢ cient
owners decision line, `xmax, is also illustrated in Figure 2. Notice that since 0 <
1 + A ln () < 1, the slope of the owners decision curve under voluntary exchange,
(15), is greater in absolute value than that of the owners socially e¢ cient decision
curve, (8).
The developers acquisition and spending choices, A and y, respectively, are given
by the solution to
max
A;y
F (A; y)  pA+ (Kd   y)R; (16)
where the price per tract of land, p, is given by (12). Substituting (12) into the
developers problem and rearranging, we get
max
A;y
AS (A; x; y) +KdR: (17)
9In Appendix 2, we demonstrate that 1 + A ln() > 0. We also show that the curve described
by (14) is strictly concave for all x > 0 and A < 2A^, where A^ solves 1 + A ln() = 0, and strictly
convex for all x > 0 and A > 2A^.
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Figure 2: Voluntary Exchange
The solution to the developers problem (17) is given by
Fy (A; y) = R; (18)
and
FA (A; y) = f (x)  ln ()S (A; x; y) : (19)
Although the developers spending decision, y, is e¢ cient for the level of acquisition,
A, that he undertakes, (18), it follows from (19) that his property acquisition decision
is not. As we shall see, the ine¢ cient property acquisition decision is due to the
holdout problem that arises from the sequential nature of bargaining between the
developer and owners. Because of the holdout problem, the developers property
acquisition decision is distorted in the direction of purchasing too few properties
since FA (A; y) > f (x).
The slope of the locus of points described by (19) is given by10
dA
dx
= f 0 (x)
1 + A ln ()
G (A; y)  ln ()2 S (A; y; x) < 0; (20)
10Of course, we are assuming that Fy (A; y) = R. Henceforth, to avoid repetition, we always
assume that Fy (A; y) = R.
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since 1+A ln () > 0 for all x > 0 and G(A; y) < 0.11 The solution to the developers
decision problem, (18) and (19), is illustrated in Figure 2 by the curve dVDV . Dia-
grammatically speaking, since FA > f (x), curve dVDV lies below the e¢ cient curve
dD; and, the smaller is ;the bigger is the downward shift of dVDV from dD. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates that when the developer bargains sequentially with owners, there is
unambiguously too much investment and too little redevelopment compared to what
is socially e¢ cient. Notice that in Figure 2, the dVDV curve lies everywhere below
A^: In Appendix 2, we show that dVDV , which is given by the solution to (28), is
bounded above by A^, where A^ solves 1 + A^ ln() = 0.
We can summarize the above discussion in the following proposition,
Proposition 1 Voluntary exchange results in an allocation characterized by too much
investment and too little redevelopment compared to what is socially optimal.
Proof. Compare allocation aV with allocation aED in Figure 2.
5 Government Policy
Voluntary exchange generates socially ine¢ cient outcomes. Perhaps government poli-
cies can improve matters. Here we analyze two government polices. One policy is
eminent domain, ED, a policy that is widely used in practice. We consider an alter-
native government policy, which we call collective bargaining, CB. This policy has the
government forcing the developer and the all A property owners to bargain simulta-
neously with one another.
5.1 Eminent Domain
Under ED, the owner receives just compensation if his property is taken. This
implies that each owner gets f (x) whether or not his property rights are taken, i.e.,
pi = f(x) for all i = 1; : : : ; A. Alternatively, ED can be interpreted as giving all of
the bargaining power to the developer, i.e., if  = 1, then (11) implies that pi = f(x)
for all i = 1; : : : ; A.
When p = f(x) in (13), the owners investment decision problem is
argmax
x
N   A
N
f (x) +
A
N
f (x) + (K`   x)R: (21)
The solution is given implicitly by f 0 (x) = R or x = xmax. The locus of points
that describe the owners optimal investment decision under ED is described by the
perpendicular line `EDxmax in Figure 3.
11Since the developers problem (17) is highly non-linear, the locus of points described by (19) is
not necessarily a convex function in (x;A) space. In Appendix 2, we document that the solutions
to the developers and ownersproblems are well behaved.
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Figure 3: Eminent Domain
The developer pays f (x) for each property he acquires. His decision problem is
given by the solution to (16), which under ED can be simplied to
max
A;y
S (A; x; y) +KdR: (22)
Hence, the developer maximizes the surplus S associated with redevelopment. Since
the social welfare function (1) can be rewritten as
W (A; x; y) = S (A; x; y) +Nf (x) +N (K`   x)R +KdR; (23)
the developers objective under ED, (22), for a given x, coincides with maximizing
social welfare. As a result, the developers spending, y, and acquisition, A, decisions
are e¢ cient, and are given by (3) and (4), respectively. The developers decision
regarding the level of redevelopment is given by the socially optimal locus dD in
Figure 3. The allocation associated with an ED regime, aED, is illustrated by the
intersection of the dD and `EDxmax loci in Figure 3, and the level of social welfare
associated with this allocation is given by the curve WED.
A policy of ED eliminates the holdout problem because it gives all of the bar-
gaining power to the developer. And, since the developer has all of the bargaining
power he receives all of the surplus he has an incentive to maximize total surplus
or social welfare. Although an ED policy eliminates the holdout problem, it creates
another: It exacerbates the ownersoverinvestment in their properties. As Figure 3 il-
lustrates, owners undertake the maximum investment in their properties, xmax, which
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exceeds the level of investment undertaken by voluntary exchange, xV , described by
allocation aV = (xV ; AV ).12
Is a policy of ED socially desirable? In Figure 3, social welfare associated with ED
is given by WED. Suppose that under voluntary exchange, the developers decision
locus (which is not illustrated) intersects the owners decision locus, `V xmax, at aV
in Figure 3. In this situation, social welfare associated with allocation aV exceeds
that associated with ED, WED. Hence, from a social perspective, ED would be an
inappropriate policy. Although ED eliminates the holdout problem which is ben-
ecial from a social welfare perspective the increase in overinvestment that results
ultimately reduces social welfare compared to voluntary exchange. Suppose, instead,
that the holdout problem is more severe than that depicted in Figure 3. (The holdout
problem can be made more severe by lowering the developers bargaining power .)
Then, it is possible that the developers decision locus intersects the owners decision
locus, `V xmax, below the intersection of WED with the owners decision locus, say at
allocation a0V . In this situation, a policy of ED increases social welfare. The following
denition is helpful.
Denition 2 The holdout problem is said to be severe if the developers decision
locus under voluntary exchange intersects the `V xmax locus below the intersection of
WED and `V xmax curves in Figure 3.
We can summarize the above discussion by the following proposition,
Proposition 3 A necessary condition for welfare associated with ED to exceed that
of voluntary exchange is that the developers holdout problem is severe. As well,
investment under ED always exceeds investment under voluntary exchange.
Proof. Given Denition 2, compare allocation aED with allocation a0V in Figure 3.
Investment under ED, aED, always exceeds investment under voluntary exchange,
aV . Investment under ED takes on its maximum possible value, xmax; for all  < 1,
investment under voluntary exchange is strictly less than this maximum value, see
Figure 3.
We are, however, unable to make any general claims regarding the level of devel-
opment. To see why, notice that decreasing  shifts the developers decision locus
down from dD; holding the owners locus constant, a reduction in  increases in-
vestment x, see Figure 3. However, decreasing , decreases the slope of the owners
decision locus `V xmax, which e¤ectively causes it to pivot at xmax toward the origin;
holding the developers decision locus constant, a reduction in  decreases investment
x, see Figure 3. The decisions of owners and the developer work in opposite directions
12Allocation aV is determined by the intersection of the owners locus `V xmax and the developers
locus dVDV (which is not illustrated in Figure 3). Depending on the developers bargaining strength
 2 (0; 1), voluntary exchange allocation, aV , will lie somewhere on locus `V xmax between points a1
and (xmax; 0) in Figure 3.
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regarding changes in the level of redevelopment brought about by changes in . As
a result, the level of redevelopment under ED may be greater than or less than that
under voluntary exchange.13
5.2 Collective Bargaining
We now consider an alternative government policy that requires the developer and all
of the A owners to bargain simultaneously over the transference of property rights.
Intuitively, the government gets the developer and A owners into a room and tells
them to collectively determine the price(s) for the transference of the ownersproperty
rights to the developer. In the model, the governments collective bargaining, CB,
policy species a simultaneous bargaining game that agents play.
The collective bargaining game is similar to the two-stage proposal game which
involves 2 players but is augmented to accommodate A + 1 players. After the
developer chooses the A tracts of land that he wants to acquire for development, the
two-stage collective bargaining game has the developer making A simultaneous o¤ers
to each of the owners, where each owner simultaneously either accepts or rejects the
o¤er.14 If all owners accept, then property rights are transferred between the owners
and the developer at the terms of trade specied in the bargain. Suppose, instead,
that one or more of the owners reject the developers o¤er. Then, with probability ,
the developer gets to make A take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the owners. In this case, the
developer will, in equilibrium, o¤er f (x) to each of the A owners; since owners are
indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting, they all accept. With probability 1  ,
one of the owners is randomly chosen and gets to make A take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to
the A   1 other owners and the developer. The probability that a particular owner
gets to make the o¤er is 1=A. In this case, the owner will, in equilibrium, o¤er f (x) to
each of the A 1 other owners and Ry to the developer, where y solves Fy(A; y) = R;
since the owners and developer are indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting, they
all accept. Hence, the equilibrium price that the developer o¤ers to each of the A
13Note, however, we were unable to generate any examples where the level of redevelopment under
voluntary exchange exceeded that under ED.
14One can assume a full enforcement environment, where all A owners are required to participate
in the collective bargain. Alternatively, one can assume that an owners decision to participate
in the collective bargain is voluntary. In this case, some form of punishment may be needed
to induce an owner to participate. For example, one can assume that if an owner chooses not to
participate, his property will be expropriated via ED if the collective bargain between the developer
and the remaining A   1 owners is successful. (ED is the default outcome if an owner chooses
not to participate in the collective bargain.) In this event, the non-participating owner will receive
compensation f(x) for his property. It is straightforward to show that if ED is the default outcome
for an owner who does not participate in the collective bargain, then owners will voluntarily
participate in the collective bargain.
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owners in the rst stage, p, is given by
p = f (x) + (1  )

1
A
[F (A; y)  yR  (A  1) f (x)] + A  1
A
f (x)

(24)
= f (x) +
1  
A
S (A; x; y) :
Since all A owners are indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the rst-stage o¤er
p, (24), they will all accept. Notice that the collective bargaining price, (24), is lower
than the average price associated with voluntary exchange, (12). This implies that
collective bargaining mitigates the holdout problem since, on average, owners receive
a smaller share of the surplus that is generated through redevelopment compared
with voluntary exchange. (In fact, the government policy of collective bargaining
eliminates the holdout problem.)
Under the policy of collective bargaining, an owners investment decision, x, is
given by the solution to
argmax
x
N   A
N
f (x) +
A
N
p+ (K`   x)R; (25)
where p is given by (24). The solution to (25) is (implicitly) given by,
N (1 )A
N
f 0 (x) = R if A  `CB
x = 0 if A > `CB
(26)
where CBin `CB stands for collective bargaining,and `CB solves
N   (1  ) `CB
N
f 0 (0) = R:
The developers acquisition and spending choices, A and y, respectively, are given
by the solution to (16). In light of (24), the developers problem can be rewritten as
max
A;y
S (A; x; y) +KdR: (27)
Hence, the developers objective is to maximize surplus, S (A; x; y), which implies
that the developers objective is consistent with maximizing social welfare, taking
x as given. Therefore, the developer behaves e¢ ciently, and his spending, y, and
acquisition, A, decisions are given by (3) and (4), respectively. Notice that since the
developer receives the same share of the total surplus, , independent of the number
of properties that are acquired and redeveloped, he does not face a hold-out problem.
The developers decision is described by locus dD in Figure 4, which is identical
to the locus dD in Figure 1. The locus of points that describe the owners investment
decision, (26), is depicted in Figure 4 by `CBxmax for x > 0 and the locus that describes
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Figure 4: Collective Bargaining
the socially e¢ cient decision, (2), is depicted by `xmax. (Comparing (26) with (2),
note that locus `CBxmax is steeper than locus `xmax, as depicted.) The equilibrium
collective bargaining outcome, aCB = (xCB; ACB), is given by the lower intersection
of the `CBxmax and dD curves, and the socially e¢ cient outcome is a. As with
the policy of ED, the CB policy has too much investment and too little development
compared to what is socially e¢ cient.
Figure 4 reveals a rather important policy result,
Proposition 4 Social welfare is strictly lower under a policy of ED compared to a
policy of CB. As well, investment is higher and redevelopment is lower under ED
compared to CB.
Proof. Both the ED and CB allocations lie on the e¢ cient developers decision locus
dD, see Figure 4. Since welfare decreases when moving away from the e¢ cient
allocation, a, along the locus dD, the welfare associated with allocation aCB is
greater than that associated with allocation aED. To see that investment is higher
and redevelopment is lower under ED compared to CB, compare allocations aCB and
aED in Figure 4.
The economic intuition that underlies this proposition is straightforward: Both
policies eliminate the holdout problem, which is benecial from a social perspec-
tive. However, a policy of ED leads to more overinvestment than a policy of CB.
Proposition 4 implies that the government should only entertain a policy of collective
bargaining; the government should never pursue a policy of ED.
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5.3 Optimal Policy
Given Proposition 4, the government should never choose a policy of ED because it
is dominated by the CB policy. Is a policy of CB socially desirable? In Figure 5,
social welfare associated with CB is given by WCB which, in turn, is determined by
the intersection of the owners decision locus, `CBxmax, and the developers decision
locus, dD. Suppose that under voluntary exchange, the developers decision locus
(which is not illustrated in Figure 5) intersects the owners decision locus, `V xmax,
at aV in Figure 5.15 In this situation, social welfare associated with allocation aV
exceeds that associated with CB, WCB. Hence, a policy of CB will lower social
welfare. Although CB eliminates the holdout problem as was also the case with the
ED policy the resulting increase in overinvestment that results from the CB policy
leads to a decrease in social welfare compared to voluntary exchange. Suppose, now
that the holdout problem under voluntary exchange is worse than depicted in Figure
5. Then, it is possible that the developers decision locus intersects the owners
decision locus, `V xmax, below the intersection of WCB with the owners decision locus
at allocation a0V . In this situation, a policy of CB increases social welfare. The
following denition is needed for what follows.
Denition 5 The holdout problem is said to be signicant if the developers deci-
sion locus under voluntary exchange intersects the `V xmax locus below the intersection
of WCB and `V xmax curves and above the intersection of the WED and `V xmax curves
in Figure 5.
We can summarize this discussion by the following proposition,
Proposition 6 A necessary condition for welfare associated with CB to exceed that
of voluntary exchange is that the developers holdout problem is signicant.
Proof. Given Denition 5, compare allocation aCB with allocation a0V in Figure 5.
The condition is not su¢ cient because the welfare associated with CB exceeds that
of voluntary exchange if the holdout problem is severe.
The allocation and social welfare associated with the ED policy is illustrated in
Figure 5 by aED and WED, respectively. Consider the voluntary exchange allocation
a0V . Notice that for this allocation the holdout problem is signicant but not severe.
16
15The owners decision locus, `CBxmax, lies above the voluntary exchange for all A > 1. We
assume the model parameters are such that the developer wants to redevelop multiple tracts.
16We are able to produce examples associated with the outcomes described in Figures 2, 4 and 5.
In particular, by varying the value of , we are able to generate equilibria associated with Figures
2, 4 and 5 when we use the following functional forms and parameter values: f (x) = 11  log (1 + x),
F (A; y;P ) = 23 A:44y:36, N = 30, and R = 1:05.
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Figure 5: Desirability of a CB Policy
6 Discussion
In defending the states right to take property from one private agent and give
it to another private agent, proponents of the Kelo decision who are often local
governments point to the increased benets associated with higher levels of redevel-
opment, such as more employment and higher taxes collected. Although it may be the
case that the use of ED will increase the level of redevelopment and other activities
associated with it it is not obvious that this translates into higher social welfare. In
fact, we can construct examples where the equilibrium allocation has a higher level
of redevelopment under ED compared to either voluntary exchange allocations but a
lower level of social welfare. If local governments equate higher levels of employment
and tax revenue that usually accompany higher levels of redevelopment with a
higher level of social welfare, then allowing communities to use ED to promote re-
development can lead to bad outcomes. For example, if local governments use their
power of ED when the holdout problem is not severe, then there will be a negative
impact on social welfare compared to voluntary exchange.
If government policy can improve matters, it is not obvious that using ED is the
most e¢ cient way to do it. We have shown that an alternative policy of collective
bargaining dominates ED. One may argue that this dominance result depends on
the precise specication of the simultaneous bargaining game. Perhaps, but the big
insight is that collective bargaining, in general, does not dilute the bargaining power
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of the owners, as does ED. This implies that the ownersincentive to overinvest is
mitigated compared to ED. And this insight is important because the benet of both
the ED and CB policies is the elimination of the holdout problem. But the cost to
both policies is the tendency to increase the level of overinvestment, and the incentive
to overinvest is lessened under CB compared to ED.
A government policy that allows developers to purchase as many properties that
they want for justcompensation will promote redevelopment compared to a situ-
ation where developers obtain property rights by bargaining with owners that have
an incentive to create a holdout problem. However, such a policy also results in
landowners further increasing their already ine¢ cient levels of investment on their
properties. From a social perspective, eminent domain is a good policy only if the
former redevelopment e¤ect dominates the latter overinvestment e¤ect. The
general Kelo ruling, which allows communities to transfer property rights from one
private agent to another with just compensation, can be justied from a social per-
spective only if it is always the case that the holdout problem is severe(in the sense
described in Denition 2). It is unlikely, however, that in all instances developers face
severe holdout problems. The general Kelo ruling makes for bad public policy on two
counts. First, in many applications of the Kelo ruling, social welfare will fall because
the holdout problem is not severe. Second, there exist other policies, such as the col-
lective bargaining policy outlined above, that strictly dominate eminent domain. The
latter implies that eminent domain should never be used to transfer property rights
of one private agent to another private agent. Similarly, an unconditional policy of
collective bargaining is not optimal since such a policy will lower social welfare if the
holdout problem is not signicant(in the sense described in Denition 5). An op-
timal policy requires that the government rst assesses the magnitude of the holdout
problem that the developer faces and then to impose a policy of collective bargaining
only if the holdout problem is signicant; otherwise, the government should allow
voluntary exchange to determine the level of redevelopment in its community.
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8 Appendix 1: Derivation of pi
Suppose the developer wants to redevelop A tracts of land. He selects A owners and
plays an A-stage bargaining game with them. At stage i of the A-stage game, the
developer plays the two-stage proposal game with owner i. Suppose that owner j
can observe the accepted o¤ers of the previous j   1 owners. If redevelopment is
to occur, the developer must reach an agreement with each of the A owners; if not,
redevelopment does not occur. If redevelopment does not occur, then, at date 2 all
N owners receive the payo¤ f (x) + (K`   x)R and the developer gets KdR.
Consider the last owner, owner A, that the developer bargains with. Suppose that
owner A rejects the developers rst-stage o¤er. Then with probability 1  , owner
A makes the second stage take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. The o¤er will make the developer
indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. Hence, the o¤er is yR, which implies that
owner A gets F (A; y)  yR  PA 1i=1 pi, since the developer has promised to pay the
rst A 1 ownersPA 1i=1 pi. With probability , the developer makes the second stage
o¤er, and o¤ers f (x), which owner A accepts. Therefore, the equilibrium rst-stage
o¤er that the developer makes to owner A is
pA = f (x) + (1  )
 
F (A; y)  yR 
A 1X
i=1
pi
!
:
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Consider now owner j and suppose that the owner rejects the developers rst-
stage o¤er. If the developer makes the second-stage o¤er, he o¤ers f (x), which
owner j accepts. If owner j makes the second-stage o¤er, he o¤ers yR +
Pj 1
i=1 pi +
(A  j) f (x), i.e., the o¤er compensates the developer for his redevelopment costs,
yR, his promised payments to the rst j  1 owners,Pj 1i=1 pi, and su¢ cient resources
to pay the remaining A  j owners their reservation values, (A  j) f (x). Therefore,
the equilibrium rst stage o¤er that the developer makes to owner j is
pj = f (x) + (1  )
 
F (A; y)  yR 
j 1X
i=1
pi   (A  j) f (x)
!
: (28)
Using (28), the rst-stage o¤er that the developer makes to the rst owner in the
bargaining queue, p1, is
p1 = f (x) + (1  ) (F (A; y)  yR  (A  1) f (x)) : (29)
which can be rearranged to
p1 = f (x) + (1  )S (A; x; y) ; (30)
where S (A; x; y) = F (A; y)  yR  Af (x).
Again, using (28), the rst-stage o¤er that developer makes to owner 2, p2, is
p2 = f (x) + (1  ) (F (A; y)  yR  p1   (A  2) f (x)) : (31)
If (30) is substituted into (31), then p2 can be rearranged to
p2 = f (x) + (1  ) S (A; x; y) : (32)
Continuing in this manner, a simple induction argument implies that if the devel-
oper wants to redevelop A tracts of land, then the rst-stage o¤er that he makes to
owner j, pj, j = 1; :::; A, is
pj = f (x) + (1  ) j 1SA: (33)
9 Appendix 2: Developers and Owners Decision
Curves
Slope of developers decision curve is negative. It must necessarily be the
case that 1 + A ln () > 0 for all x > 0, which implies that (20) is negative. To see
this, suppose that there exists an x0 > 0 such that 1 + A0 ln () < 0, where (x0; A0)
satises (19), (and where y0 is determined by (18).) Now, choose an ~A <  1= ln ().
From (19), there exists an x = ~x that satises A = ~A. If x is reduced from ~x, by (20),
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A will increase from ~A. Since the developers decision functions (18) and (19) are
continuous and well behavedin (x;A; y) and since there exists an x0 > 0 such that
1+A0 ln () < 0, A will continue to increase as x decreases until A = A^ =  1= ln ().
Dene the x associated with A^ as x^. Since (20) is negative for all x > x^, it must
be the case that x0 < x^. Now, consider increasing x from x0. Since A0 > A^ and
the developers decision functions (18) and (19) are continuous in (x;A; y), A must
increase from A0. In other words, equation (20) implies that A is an increasing
function of x for all x 2 (x0; x^), and that A (x^  ") > A^ for " > 0, where " is
arbitrarily small. Hence, there is a discontinuity in (18) and (19) at x^, i.e., A and
the corresponding y must jump when x is reduced slightly from x^. But all of
the developers decision functions (18) and (19) are continuous and well behaved in
(x;A; y); a contradiction. Hence, 1 + A ln () > 0. Note also that the absolute value
of the slope of the developers decision locus (20) is strictly less than that of the
developers e¢ cient decision locus (10).
Owners decision curve is strictly convex over the economically relevant
range. The derivative of (15) with respect to x is
d2A
dx2
=
f 000 (x) f 0 (x)  2f 00 (x)2
f 0 (x)3

1  A (1 + A ln ()) 1NR
+
f 00 (x)
f 0 (x)2
ln () A (2 + A ln ())
1  A (1 + A ln ())2 dAdxNR: (34)
The rst term on the right side of (34) is negative by Assumption 1; the second term
is strictly negative for A 2 (0; 2= ln ()) and strictly positive for A >  2= ln ().
Therefore, the owners locus (14) is strictly concave for all A 2 (0; 2= ln ()). Recall
that the developers decision curve is bounded from above by  1= ln(); therefore,
the owners decision curve is strictly convex over the economically relevant range.
Developers curve is not convex. The derivative of (20) with respect to x is
d2A
dx2
=  f 0 (x) (1 + A ln ())

[GA  GyFAy=Fyy] dA
dx
=D2
  ln ()2

[(FA   f (x))] dA
dx
  Af 0 (x)

=D2

+ f 00 (x) (1 + A ln ()) =D + f 0 (x) ln ()
dA
dx
=D;
where D = G (A; y)   ln ()2 S (A; y; x). This condition cannot be signed: the last
term is negative, while all the other terms are positive.
In principle, then, the owners decision locus, (14), and the developers decision
locus, (19), may intersect more than twice.17 We believe, however, that such an
17Although this may happen in principle, we were unable to construct such examples.
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Figure 6: Voluntary Exchange Equilibrium
outcome is highly unlikely. If anything, we nd that, unless the developer has virtually
all of the bargaining power, these loci will intersect only once. This nding is a result
of the combination that: (i) the developers holdoutlocus (19) lies below the e¢ cient
locus (4); (ii) the slope of the developers holdout locus (20) is strictly less in absolute
value than that of the e¢ cient locus (10); and (iii) the maximum value of A that the
developer chooses in the holdout environment is nite and less than A^ =  1= ln ().
Intuitively, compared to the developers e¢ cient locus (4), his holdout locus (19) is, in
(x;A) space, pushed down,attened outand constrained in its height.A simple
example and diagram might be helpful here. Suppose that  = 0:95 and N = 50. The
developers decision locus, which we denote as dVDV in Figure 6, intersects the A axis
at a value that is strictly less than A^ = 19:5, i.e., A^ =  1= ln ().18 When  = 0:95
(and assuming that f 0 (0) is large) the owners decision locus, which we denote as
`V xmax in Figure 6, intersects the A axis at a value that exceeds N = 50. The owners
decision locus is strictly concave for all A < 2A^. Note that the owners decision locus
intersects the A-axis at a level that is signicantly higher than where the developers
locus intersects. This is in direct contrast to the CB or ED environments, where the
developers locus tends to innity as x tends to zero. The developers and owners
decision loci intersect at allocation a1 = (x1; A1) in Figure 6. Since the absolute value
of the slope of the developers decision locus dVDV is less than that of the e¢ cient
decision locus, for comparison purposes, we shift down the developers e¢ cient locus,
18Exactly where it intersects will depend on the model parameters.
25
(4), in Figure 6 until it intersects allocation a1, and denote this locus as dsD

s , (s
for shift). In Figure 6, locus dsD

s intersects the owners locus `V xmax twice; at
allocations a1 and a2. If the developers locus dVDV is to intersect the owners locus
at least twice, the second and subsequent intersections would have to lie north-west
of allocation a2 = (x2; A2) (since locus dVDV is less steep than locus dsD

s). But this
is not possible in Figure 6 since A2 > A^. One could, however, imagine that locus
dsD

s is actually much steeper than what is depicted in Figure 6 so that it intersects
the owners locus `V xmax at, say, allocation a3, where A3 < A^. It is then possible for
the developers curve to intersect the owners locus `V xmax at an allocation where the
number of tracts that are redeveloped is less than A^. For this to happen, the slope
of the developers locus would have to be only slightly less in absolute value than
that of the e¢ cient locus as x is reduced from x1; but then the slope would have to
dramatically atten out after it intersects the owners locus `V xmax for a second time
in order to ensure that A < A^ for all possible choices of x. Such a characterization,
however, is not feasible. If the values of the slopes of the holdout and e¢ cient loci
are very close to one another and, hence, as well as the loci themselves then this
implies that  is arbitrarily close to 1 and A^ is arbitrarily high. In this situation,
the CB policy and voluntary exchange environments will deliver similar equilibrium
outcomes since the holdout problem is not that important,i.e., when  is arbitrarily
close to 1, ln () is arbitrarily close to 0 and the developers decision problem is
characterized by FA (A; y)  f (x). In such a case, the `V xmax and dVDV loci in the
voluntary exchange environment will intersect twice, and the lower intersection will
deliver a higher level of social welfare.19 So unless  is arbitrarily close to 1, the
`V xmax and dVDV loci will only intersect once.
19For every numerical example that we constructed, we found that if  is arbitrarily high, the
developers and the owners loci will intersect only twice and that the lower intersection generates
the higher level of social welfare.
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